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OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
 This appeal requires us to determine whether the 
individual needs of an employee can justify noncompliance 
with an employer’s reasonable administrative order.  The 
Virgin Islands Wrongful Discharge Act (the “WDA”) permits 
the termination of an employee “who wilfully and 
intentionally disobeys reasonable and lawful rules, orders, 
and instructions of the employer.”  V.I. Code Ann. tit. 24, § 
76(a)(4).  Here, in lieu of providing his employees with a 
paycheck, Appellant Desmond Maynard (“Maynard”) paid 
his employees in cash, requiring that they endorse an 
unsigned paycheck as a receipt of payment.  After receiving 
cash remuneration one week in September 1996, Appellee 
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Cheryl Martin-Liburd (“Martin-Liburd”), an employee of 
Maynard’s, refused to endorse the paycheck presented to her 
as a receipt for Maynard.  Her refusal led Maynard to fire her 
for noncompliance.  At a hearing before the Virgin Islands 
Department of Labor (“DOL”), Martin-Liburd testified that 
she needed a signed paycheck to apply for and receive 
government financial assistance.  She had never shared this 
information with Maynard before the hearing.   
 The Appellate Division of the District Court held that, 
given Martin-Liburd’s need for written verification of her 
income, Maynard’s order was unreasonable and that Martin-
Liburd’s resulting termination was in violation of the WDA.  
The Appellate Division also awarded Martin-Liburd back 
pay.  We hold that the Appellate Division erred by 
considering Martin-Liburd’s individual needs when 
determining the reasonableness of Maynard’s order.  
Maynard’s directive was an archetypal administrative order 
for which Martin-Liburd’s compliance was not dependent on 
her wants or desires.  We will reverse the Appellate 
Division’s July 19, 2010 Order. 
I. 
Maynard operated a legal practice in the Virgin 
Islands—the Law Offices of Desmond L. Maynard.  The firm 
had several employees.  On each pay day, which occurred on 
Mondays, Maynard would provide his employees with a 
paycheck.  Employees would typically spend their one hour 
lunch break travelling to and from a local bank to cash their 
paychecks.  Based on the proximity of the bank, coupled with 
long lines, this process often caused employees to exceed 
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their allotted one hour break for lunch.1
Faced with complaints from his employees about time 
expended going to the bank and his desire to decrease 
unproductive time spent by his employees, Maynard decided 
to alter the manner in which he paid his employees.  He began 
paying his employees in cash, whenever possible,
   
2
In March 1995, Martin-Liburd commenced 
employment as a legal secretary at Maynard’s firm.  When 
she began work there, he had already implemented the cash 
payment policy.  On many occasions, Martin-Liburd was paid 
in cash and endorsed the unsigned paycheck as written proof 
of payment.  The exchange of cash for an unsigned paycheck 
was a regular occurrence.   
 and then 
either simultaneously or soon thereafter handing his 
employees an unsigned paycheck, which they endorsed as a 
receipt of payment. 
On September 30, 1996, Martin-Liburd was once again 
paid in cash.  That same day, Martin-Liburd was presented 
                                              
1 The facts underlying this appeal arose in the mid-
1990s.  At that time, lines were unavoidable if a person 
sought to conduct any business at the bank, as communication 
with a bank teller was necessary to facilitate financial 
transactions.  Modern advancements in technology now 
permit a person to transact a plethora of bank-related business 
either online or at an automated teller machine, rendering the 
problem Maynard’s employees faced a historical relic. 
2 Maynard made payroll disbursements in cash 
whenever he had cash on hand at the office. 
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with a paycheck not signed by Maynard, the payor, and asked 
to endorse the paycheck and return it to the office manager.  
Martin-Liburd refused.  Maynard approached Martin-Liburd 
to discuss her refusal to sign the paycheck.  Martin-Liburd 
replied that the paycheck was invalid without Maynard’s 
signature.  Maynard persisted that the paycheck functioned 
merely as a receipt.   
On October 1, 1996, Maynard again approached 
Martin-Liburd and asked her once more to endorse the 
paycheck, as requested.  Martin-Liburd again refused.  In 
response, Maynard informed her that she would be terminated 
if she did not comply.  After a verbal disagreement between 
the two, Martin-Liburd left the building.  That day was 
Martin-Liburd’s last at Maynard’s firm.   
Following her discharge, Martin-Liburd filed a 
complaint against Maynard with the DOL, alleging that she 
was wrongfully discharged in violation of the WDA.  V.I. 
Code Ann. tit. 24, §§ 76-79.  At the DOL hearing, Martin-
Liburd stated, for the first time, that she needed a signed 
paycheck from Maynard so that she could apply for and 
receive financial assistance from the Women, Infants, and 
Children Program (“WIC”), operating under the Virgin 
Islands Department of Health, and food stamps.3
                                              
3 The parties focus solely on Martin-Liburd’s 
eligibility for WIC financial assistance.  Going forward, so 
shall we. 
  Martin-
Liburd contended that she was ineligible for WIC support 
without verification of her income.  It is unclear from the 
testimony, however, whether Martin-Liburd ever 
communicated to Maynard that she desired a signed copy of 
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the paycheck to submit to WIC.4
On February 19, 1997, Carmelo Rivera, the DOL 
Commissioner, found that Martin-Liburd was wrongfully 
discharged and awarded her back pay.  Maynard filed a 
petition for a writ of review with the Superior Court of the 
Virgin Islands, pursuant to V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, § 1421.  On 
August 23, 2005, the Superior Court affirmed the DOL’s 
decision.  The Superior Court held that Maynard’s order was 
unreasonable because it denied Martin-Liburd proof of her 
income necessary to apply for and receive WIC assistance, 
rendering her termination in violation of the WDA.  Maynard 
appealed to the District Court for the Virgin Islands, 
Appellate Division (the “Appellate Division”).
  Nevertheless, the WIC 
certification form introduced at the hearing indicates that 
proof of income could be established through a number of 
means, including:  (1) an unemployment check; (2) paycheck 
stubs for all working members of the household; or (3) the 
most recent W2 form.  Martin-Liburd testified that she never 
provided Maynard or his office manager with a copy of this 
form. 
5
                                              
4 Martin-Liburd repeatedly testified that she informed 
Maynard and his office manager that a signed paycheck was 
necessary so that she could “take care of [her] business.”  
(App. 43, 45.) 
   
5 Had Maynard appealed the Superior Court’s decision 
after January 29, 2007, the appeal would have been filed with 
the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands, which assumed 
appellate jurisdiction from the Appellate Division of the 
District Court as of that date.  See Hypolite v. People of the 
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 On July 19, 2010, the Appellate Division concluded 
that “reasonable minds could disagree as to whether 
Maynard’s order to Martin-Liburd was reasonable” under the 
WDA.  Maynard v. Rivera, No. 2005/171, 2010 WL 
2851616, at *3 (D.V.I. July 19, 2010).  Given this 
disagreement, the Appellate Division held that the deferential 
standard of review applicable to evidentiary findings by the 
DOL did not permit reversal of the Superior Court’s decision.  
Id. at *4.  The Appellate Division also affirmed the award of 
back pay.  Id. 
 In dissent, Chief Judge Gómez argued that the majority 
created a “new wrongful discharge standard” in which the 
needs of the employee governed the determination of whether 
an employer’s order was reasonable.  Id. at *4 (Gómez, C.J., 
dissenting).  Chief Judge Gómez argued that Maynard’s order 
was a classic administrative order, which courts uniformly 
have agreed are reasonable.  Id. at *5. 
II. 
 The Superior Court had appellate jurisdiction to review 
the DOL’s findings under V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, § 1421.  The 
Appellate Division exercised appellate jurisdiction over the 
Superior Court’s order, pursuant to 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(a).  We 
have jurisdiction to review the Appellate Division’s Order, 
pursuant to 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(c). 
 AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 In reviewing the Appellate Division’s Order, we 
employ the same standard of review as that applied by the 
Superior Court, the first tribunal to review the DOL’s 
                                                                                                     
V.I., No. 2007-135, 2009 WL 152319, at *2 (V.I. Jan. 21, 
2009) (per curiam). 
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decision.  Tyler v. Armstrong, 365 F.3d 204, 208 (3d Cir. 
2004).  The Superior Court reviewed the DOL’s factual 
findings under the substantial evidence standard.  V.I. Code 
Ann. tit. 24, § 70(b).  We, too, employ this standard of review 
as to the Appellate Division’s factual determinations, 
inquiring whether there existed “relevant evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion.”  Soubik v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. 
Programs, 366 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir. 2004).  As with other 
legal inquiries, the Appellate Division’s interpretation of the 
WDA is reviewed de novo.  See Bryan v. Ponce, No. 2008-
004, 2009 WL 586733, at *2 (V.I. Mar. 6, 2009). 
III. 
 The WDA provides that an employer can lawfully fire 
an employee for one of nine enumerated reasons.  V.I. Code 
Ann. tit. 24, § 76(a).  As a result, the WDA amounts to a 
“statutory abrogation of the common law rule of at-will 
employment applicable in the Virgin Islands.”  Kretzer v. 
Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 218 F. Supp. 2d 724, 728 (D.V.I. 2002).  
A presumption exists “that an employee has been wrongfully 
discharged if discharged for any reason other than those listed 
in Section 76(a).”  Gonzalez v. AMR, 549 F.3d 219, 222 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); see also V.I. Code Ann. tit. 24, 
§ 76(c).  While an employer is prohibited from firing an 
employee for any reason not listed, the WDA “cover[s] all or 
almost all legitimate reasons for discharge.”  St. Thomas–St. 
John Hotel & Tourism Ass’n v. Gov’t of the U.S. V.I., 218 
F.3d 232, 244 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
 At issue in this appeal is the fourth justification that 
permits the termination of an employee “who wilfully and 
intentionally disobeys reasonable and lawful rules, orders, 
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and instructions of the employer.”6
                                              
6 In full, the WDA permits the termination of any 
employee: 
  V.I. Code Ann. tit. 24, § 
(1) who engages in a business 
which conflicts with his duties to 
his employer or renders him a 
rival of his employer; 
(2) whose insolent or offensive 
conduct toward a customer of the 
employer injures the employer's 
business; 
(3) whose use of intoxicants or 
controlled substances interferes 
with the proper discharge of his 
duties; 
(4) who wilfully and intentionally 
disobeys reasonable and lawful 
rules, orders, and instructions of 
the employer; provided, however, 
the employer shall not bar an 
employee from patronizing the 
employer's business after the 
employee's working hours are 
completed; 
(5) who performs his work 
assignments in a negligent 
manner; 
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76(a)(4).   
A. Analytical Framework 
 Before we determine whether Martin-Liburd’s 
termination was in violation of the WDA, we must first 
address the analytical framework governing her claim. 
 The parties assert that the Supreme Court’s three-
prong test for evaluating federal employment discrimination 
claims, established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
411 U.S. 792 (1973), applies with equal force to claims 
brought under the WDA, a territorial law.  As support, the 
parties cite to Rajbahadoorsingh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 
                                                                                                     
(6) whose continuous absences 
from his place of employment 
affect the interests of his 
employer; 
(7) who is incompetent or 
inefficient, thereby impairing his 
usefulness to his employer; 
(8) who is dishonest; or 
(9) whose conduct is such that it 
leads to the refusal, reluctance or 
inability of other employees to 
work with him. 
V.I. Code Ann. tit. 24, § 76(a)(1)-(a)(9). 
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NA, 168 F. Supp. 2d 496 (D.V.I. 2001), in which the district 
court first applied the McDonnell Douglas framework to the 
WDA.  Id. at 503-05.  In that case, the district court reasoned 
that the McDonnell Douglas test was applicable because the 
WDA was borne out of the same congressional intent 
underlying federal employment discrimination statutes.  Id.  
 Under the modified McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting framework that the district court promulgated, a 
plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of wrongful 
discharge.  This requires a showing that:  “(1) he was an 
employee; (2) of a covered employer; (3) he was discharged; 
and (4) the discharge was wrongful.”  Id. at 504-05.  The 
employer then bears the burden of production “to articulate 
some legitimate, statutorily-approved reason for the plaintiff’s 
discharge.”  Id. at 505 (citation omitted).  “Finally, after the 
employer has offered one or more of the statutorily-approved 
reasons for its actions, the burden of production under the 
third and final prong shifts back to the plaintiff to show, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the proffered reason is 
pretextual.”  Id. 
 As we have noted, with the creation of the Superior 
Court of the Virgin Islands (formerly the Territorial Court), 
the district court has long been divested of original 
jurisdiction over matters arising purely under territorial law.  
Parrott v. Gov’t of the V.I., 230 F.3d 615, 620 (3d Cir. 2000).  
An inexorable consequence of divestment was the district 
court’s inability to continue contributing to the development 
of Virgin Islands local law.  Edwards v. HOVENSA, LLC, 497 
F.3d 355, 358-59 (3d Cir. 2007).  With the establishment of 
the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands, the final say on 
territorial law now rests with the Virgin Islands’ highest 
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court.7
 When Rajbahadoorsingh was decided, it was 
understandably impossible for the district court to look to 
guidance from the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands—a 
court not yet in existence—to determine what analytical 
framework to apply to claims brought under the WDA.  
Although its jurisprudence is nascent, the Supreme Court of 
the Virgin Islands has yet to speak on this issue.  While we 
are without guidance from the highest court, we can “garner 
assistance from the decisions of the state’s intermediate 
appellate courts in predicting how the state’s highest court 
would rule.”  Mosley v. Wilson, 102 F.3d 85, 92 (3d Cir. 
1996) (citations omitted).  Of course, that, too, is another 
impossibility, for the Virgin Islands has no intermediate 
territorial appellate court.  We have recognized that in such 
situations the decisions of the Superior Court of the Virgin 
Islands can be used as a gauge for ascertaining state law.  
Edwards, 497 F.3d at 361.  And the Superior Court has cited 
Rajbahadoorsingh and applied the McDonnell Douglas 
framework to claims brought under the WDA.  See, e.g., 
Fenton v. C & C Constr. & Maint., Inc., No. SX-96-CV-791, 
2007 WL 1202867, at *2-4 (V.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 4, 2007). 
  Pichardo v. V.I. Comm’r of Labor, 613 F.3d 87, 94 
(3d Cir. 2010).    
 Tasked with predicting what analytical framework the 
Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands would apply to a 
                                              
7 The Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands’ ultimate 
authority to adjudicate purely local civil matters is subject to 
this Court’s authority, for a period of fifteen years following 
the Supreme Court’s creation, to review all final decisions by 
writ of certiorari.  See 48 U.S.C. § 1613. 
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wrongful discharge claim, Edwards, 497 F.3d at 361-62 n.3, 
we question the justification for the approach taken in 
Rajbahadoorsingh.  In Rajbahadoorsingh, the district court 
attempted to draw a parallel between the legislative intent 
underlying federal employment discrimination statutes and 
the WDA.  168 F. Supp. 2d at 503-04.  Although the district 
court quoted from McDonnell Douglas’s discussion of 
congressional intent leading to the passage of Title VII, the 
district court provided no analogous discussion for the WDA.  
Absent any indication as to the Virgin Islands legislature’s 
perceived goals in promulgating the WDA, the 
Rajbahadoorsingh court’s attempted parallel falls short.8
 We also cannot find support for the Rajbahadoorsingh 
court’s conclusion that the McDonnell Douglas framework 
applies because both Title VII and the WDA share “the 
practical purpose of bring[ing] the litigants and the court 
expeditiously and fairly to th[e] ultimate question.”  
Rajbahadoorsingh, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 504 (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  While this purpose is certainly 
laudatory, it serves as an imprecise means to justify importing 
a legal test from a distinct sphere of employment litigation.  
More importantly, considerations of fairness and efficiency 
are the cornerstones of civil litigation in general and are not 
exclusive to employment matters.  See Grider v. Keystone 
Health Plan Cent., Inc., 580 F.3d 119, 123 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 
 Although we have reservations regarding the 
                                              
8 This Court’s diligent research has failed to disclose 
any legislative history to support the Rajbahadoorsingh 
court’s parallel to federal employment discrimination 
legislation. 
14 
 
application of the McDonnell Douglas analytical framework 
to WDA claims, we need not resolve the issue here.  Our 
inquiry remains the same regardless of whether or not we 
apply the framework.  The parties do not dispute that Martin-
Liburd has established her prima facie case of wrongful 
discharge, as required by the first prong.  Moreover, Martin-
Liburd has alleged no facts to support a finding of pretext in 
accordance with the third prong.  Indeed, the parties devote 
their arguments solely to the second prong of the McDonnell 
Douglas test—whether Maynard terminated Martin-Liburd 
for failing to follow a reasonable order.  See V.I. Code Ann. 
tit. 24, § 76(a)(4).  We turn now to that question.9
B.  Reasonableness of Maynard’s Order 
 
At the heart of this appeal lies an issue that has long 
been the subject of academic debate:  the proper balance 
between the exercise of employer authority and the protection 
of employee rights.  The debate is one that divided the 
Appellate Division.  Placing emphasis on its seemingly 
deferential standard of review, the majority agreed with the 
Superior Court that Martin-Liburd’s need for written 
verification of her income rendered unreasonable Maynard’s 
order directing her to endorse the unsigned paycheck.  
Maynard v. Rivera, No. 2005/171, 2010 WL 2851616, at *3-4 
(D.V.I. July 19, 2010).  The dissent disagreed with what it 
characterized as a “new wrongful discharge standard” that 
                                              
9 In its majority opinion, the Appellate Division 
omitted any reference to, and did not apply, the McDonnell 
Douglas burden-shifting test.  Given that our inquiry is 
unaffected by the application of the test, we will not address 
this omission. 
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placed improper emphasis on the personal needs of 
employees when analyzing the reasonableness of an 
employer’s order.  Id. at *4-7 (Gómez, C.J., dissenting). 
The WDA provision at issue permits the employer to 
terminate an employee “who wilfully and intentionally 
disobeys reasonable and lawful rules, orders, and instructions 
of the employer.”  V.I. Code Ann. tit. 24, § 76(a)(4).  Our 
inquiry into this provision focuses on the term 
“reasonableness.”  The question before us is whether 
Maynard’s order directing Martin-Liburd to endorse an 
unsigned paycheck as a receipt of payment was reasonable.   
As a matter of policy, courts have long been loath to 
interfere in the general day-to-day operations of a business.10
                                              
10 Donna Smith Cude & Brian M. Steger, Does Justice 
Need Glasses?  Unlawful Retaliation Under the Title VII 
Following Mattern:  Will Courts Know It When They See It?, 
14 Lab. Law. 373, 407 (1998) (“[T]he courts are not, were not 
intended to be, and should not become, personnel managers 
overseeing the day-to-day affairs of American businesses.”). 
  
Indeed, it would be improvident for courts to regulate the 
permissible manner in which an employer may choose to 
conduct his business and the company policy implemented to 
facilitate growth and profitability.  That is not to say that 
courts are handcuffed from using judicial means to remedy 
unlawful employment practices.  See, e.g., N.A.A.C.P. v. N. 
Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 476-77 (3d Cir. 
2011) (discussing framework of Title VII litigation).  But 
where the employer’s order reflects a routine administrative 
matter, courts have historically upheld such orders as 
reasonable when subject to challenge.  See, e.g., In re 
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Stanczyk, 912 N.Y.S.2d 311, 312 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) 
(concluding that employer order directing employee to attend 
mandatory training program was reasonable); Noah v. 
Lindbergh Inv., LLC, 320 S.W.3d 212, 216 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2010) (determining that employee was discharged, in part, for 
failing to follow employer’s reasonable order that employee 
immediately meet with employer to discuss employee’s 
absence from assigned shifts). 
Maynard’s standing order requiring his employees to 
endorse their unsigned paychecks as proof of payment in cash 
is a paradigmatic example of a reasonable administrative 
order.  It is customary in financial transactions to require a 
receipt for any cash payment, a convention borne out of both 
mutual convenience and financial accounting necessity.  
Without a receipt, Maynard could potentially be liable in an 
action brought by one of his employees claiming that he was 
never paid for time worked.  As prevalent as they are, receipts 
can take many forms—be they a computer printout, a hand-
drawn slip, or, in this case, a paycheck endorsed by the payee 
but unsigned by the payor.  Maynard implemented his cash 
payment policy to serve his own interests as well as the 
interests of his employees.  While his employees benefited 
from not having to spend their lunch hour on certain Mondays 
trekking to the bank to cash their paychecks only to stand on 
long lines, Maynard no longer had to pay his employees for 
nonproductive company time when his employees would 
inevitably exceed the allotted one hour for lunch.  The 
method by which he chose to pay his employees undoubtedly 
constituted a reasonable administrative decision. 
We are unpersuaded by Martin-Liburd’s attempt to 
undermine the reasonableness of Maynard’s chosen method 
of procuring a receipt.  Martin-Liburd argues that the 
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unsigned paycheck was an invalid negotiable instrument.  
Although we agree with that proposition, it does little to 
advance Martin-Liburd’s cause.11  Here, the paycheck was 
never intended to fulfill its traditional role of providing 
remuneration.  Instead, the paycheck functioned as a mere 
receipt of payment.12
Further, there is no credence to Martin-Liburd’s 
argument that regardless of whether Maynard’s order was 
facially reasonable, it was unreasonable as applied to her.  In 
essence, Martin-Liburd argues that the needs of individual 
employees should not only be imported into our analysis 
under the WDA but that those needs should trump 
compliance with an employer’s reasonable administrative 
order.  We cannot endorse Martin-Liburd’s proposition 
because the reasonableness of an administrative order cannot 
be dependent on each employee’s personal needs, whether 
known or unknown to his employer.
  That the paycheck could not be 
tendered at the bank is not in dispute or relevant.    
13
                                              
11 On several occasions prior to September 30, 1996, 
after having been paid in cash, Martin-Liburd, and other 
employees, endorsed the paycheck as requested. 
  We agree with the 
12 As Maynard acknowledged, he never intended for 
any unsigned paycheck to be a negotiable instrument given 
that an employee already would have been paid in cash. 
13 We do not address the possibility that where an 
employer is aware that his order jeopardizes an employee’s 
health or safety, the practical consequences of the order on 
the employee’s individual circumstances should be 
considered in determining whether the order is reasonable.  
See, e.g., McLean v. Unemp’t Comp. Bd. of Review, 383 A.2d 
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dissent that “[o]ur focus, in this context, should be on the 
request of the employer.”  Maynard, 2010 WL 2851616, at *6 
(Gómez, C.J., dissenting).  Martin-Liburd provides no support 
for her argument that employee compliance with an 
employer’s administrative order is necessary only to the 
extent that the order does not conflict with the employee’s 
individual desires.  This is a bald assertion with no support 
that we can discern. 
Employers promulgate a litany of reasonable 
administrative orders designed to ensure the systematic 
management of company affairs.  An understanding exists in 
the relationship between employer and employee that the 
employee will abide by these orders.  If an employee were 
entitled to unilaterally forego compliance with reasonable 
administrative orders, company officials would lose the 
predictability associated with compliance.  The employee’s 
obligation to comply with the order would be illusory and 
dependent solely on the employee’s willingness to obey.  We 
cannot countenance, as Martin-Liburd has argued, an 
employment relationship whereby the employee is vested 
with the authority to pick and choose what facially reasonable 
administrative orders to follow.   
In its majority opinion, the Appellate Division 
                                                                                                     
533, 535 (Pa. 1978) (finding employee’s refusal of 
employer’s request to drive truck with failing brakes not 
willful misconduct).  Moreover, we do not imply that an 
employer’s administrative order would be reasonable where it 
conflicts with an employee’s needs, as recognized by federal, 
state, or territorial law.  However, this case raises none of 
these concerns. 
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concluded that “reasonable minds could disagree as to 
whether Maynard’s order to Martin-Liburd was reasonable.”  
Maynard, 2010 WL 2851616, at *3.  Given its review under 
the substantial evidence standard, the majority determined 
that the “two permissible views of the evidence” required 
deference to the Superior Court’s factual determination that 
Martin-Liburd was wrongfully terminated for failing to 
comply with an unreasonable order.  Id. (quoting John F. 
Harkins Co. v. Waldinger Corp., 796 F.2d 657, 661-62 (3d 
Cir. 1986)).  But the substantial evidence standard that the 
Superior Court itself applied is self-limiting, applying only to 
“[t]he findings of the [DOL] Commissioner as to the facts.”  
V.I. Code Ann. tit. 24, § 70(b) (emphasis added).  While the 
reasonableness of Maynard’s order is a factual question, see 
Gonzalez, 549 F.3d at 224, the substantial evidence standard 
does not insulate legal precepts present in the Superior 
Court’s decision.  See Bryan, 2009 WL 586733, at *2 (“[The] 
standard of review in examining the Superior Court’s 
application of law is plenary.” (citation omitted)). 
Herein lies the foundational error in the majority’s 
decision.  The majority’s constrained interpretation of its 
standard of review precluded it from conducting the 
necessary plenary inquiry under the WDA.  Only by 
exercising such review would the Superior Court’s flawed 
interpretation of the WDA—rendering talismanic the 
employee’s individual needs when evaluating the 
reasonableness of an employer’s order—have been apparent.  
The WDA requires only that Maynard’s order be reasonable, 
not that the order satisfy a constantly evolving scale of 
reasonableness based on each employee to whom that order is 
directed.   
We agree with the dissent that the majority’s 
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determination amounted to an untenable intrusion into an 
employer’s inherent freedom to require uniform employee 
compliance with a reasonable administrative order.  Martin-
Liburd’s desire to obtain a signed paycheck to qualify for 
financial assistance from the WIC program “is beside the 
point” and provided no justification for failing to obey 
Maynard’s reasonable order.  Maynard, 2010 WL 2851616, at 
*6 (Gómez, C.J., dissenting).  Her termination was therefore 
permissible under V.I. Code Ann. tit. 24, § 76(a)(4).  
Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court’s finding that 
Martin-Liburd was terminated in violation of the WDA, and 
we will reverse the award of back pay.14
                                              
14 Although the reasonableness of Maynard’s order 
was unaffected by Martin Liburd’s needs, what also is 
apparent is that Maynard had provided numerous employees 
in the past with written verification necessary to obtain 
government assistance and even had done so on previous 
occasions for Martin-Liburd.  (App. 19, 107.)  While Martin-
Liburd was not permitted to disobey Maynard’s reasonable 
administrative order simply due to her individual needs, 
Martin-Liburd acknowledged that she never provided 
Maynard with the WIC certification form (App. 68), and only 
stated during her final protest of Maynard’s request that a 
signed paycheck was needed for her “personal business,” 
(App. 47).  And even this was untrue.  Although Martin-
Liburd claimed that she “needed” a signed paycheck, the 
WIC certification form introduced at the DOL hearing 
indicated that Martin-Liburd could have verified her income 
through a number of means, only one of which required the 
submission of a signed paycheck.  (App. 176.) 
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IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the 
Appellate Division’s July 19, 2010 Order. 
 
